The Core Design of a Small Modular Pressurised Water Reactor for
  Commercial Marine Propulsion by Peakman, Aiden et al.
The Core Design of a Small Modular Pressurised Water Reactor
for Commercial Marine Propulsion
Aiden Peakmana,b,, Hywel Owena,c, Tim Abrama
aThe University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
bThe University of Liverpool, Liverpool, Merseyside, L69 3GH, UK
cThe Cockcroft Institute, Daresbury WA4 4AD, UK
Abstract
If international agreements regarding the need to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions are to be met then there is a high probability that the shipping industry will have to dra-
matically reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. For emission reductions from ships greater than
around 40% then alternatives to fossil fuels - such as nuclear energy - will very likely be required.
A Small Modular Pressurised Water Reactor design has been developed specifically to meet the
requirements of a large container ship with a power requirement of 110 MWe. Container ships
have a number of requirements - including a small crew size and reduced outages associated with
refuelling - that result in a greater focus on design simplifications, including the elimination of
the chemical reactivity control system during power operation and a long core life.
We have developed a novel, soluble-boron free, low power density core that does not require
refuelling for 15 years. The neutronic and fuel performance behaviour of this system has been
studied with conventional UO2 fuel. The size of the pressure vessel has been limited to 3.5 metres
in diameter. Furthermore, to ensure the survivability of the cladding material, the coolant outlet
temperature has been reduced to 285◦C from 320◦C as in conventional GWe-class PWRs, with a
resulting reduction in thermal efficiency to 25%. The UO2 core design was able to satisfactorily
meet the majority of requirements placed upon the system assuming that fuel rod burnups can
be limited to 100 GWd/tHM. The core developed here represents the first workable design of
a commercial marine reactor using conventional fuel, which makes realistic the idea of using
nuclear reactors for shipping.
Keywords: Marine propulsion, Long-life, High burnup, Soluble boron free, SMR
1. Introduction
This study focuses on designing a reactor capable of powering a large container ship since
container ships dominate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the shipping industry (Vergara
et al. (2012)). As a large proportion of a ship’s operating cost is devoted to fuel costs there has
already been a considerable drive to maximise fuel efficiency of conventional large diesel en-
gines. Therefore beyond limiting ship speeds further, greater reductions in their GHG emissions
are likely to be limited without changes to fuel types (Vergara et al. (2012)).
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Whilst nuclear-powered ships have successfully operated at sea for a number of decades,
these have been primarily naval systems (or derivatives of naval systems, such as icebreakers)
and a few demonstration projects using reactors with low power outputs, typically 50 MWth or
less (Spyrou (2006); WNA (a); Bukharin (2006)). The operational requirements of large civil-
ian vessels (for example high capacity factors and economic competitiveness) mean the naval
and past demonstration reactor systems are ill-suited for use in the current fleet of commercial
container ships. For instance, the fuels that have historically been utilised in naval systems are
so-called ceramic-metallic (cermet) fuels and metallic dispersion fuels (Frost (1982)). These fuel
types have considerable drawbacks for use in a commercial setting primarily because of their rel-
ative expense compared to conventional fuel in Light Water Reactors (LWRs), and also because
their low uranium densities necessitate the use of highly enriched uranium in order to achieve
long core life (IAEA (2003); Reeve (1975)). The predominant reason for their historic use has
been because of their excellent fuel performance characteristics (Frost (1982)); for example in
the case of ceramic particles dispersed in a metallic matrix, the fuel form has an effectively higher
thermal conductivity and therefore operates at lower temperatures. This is beneficial as many fuel
properties degrade at higher temperatures. Moreover, large temperature gradients across the fuel,
with accompanying differences in thermal expansion behaviour across the fuel form can result in
excessive stresses applied to the cladding material and ultimately clad failure. Nevertheless, con-
ventional Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) fuel in commercial reactors (pellets in a cylindrical
Zircaloy tube) are relatively inexpensive and have demonstrated - through thousands of reactor
years of operation, low failure rates (Uffelen and Suzuki (2012)). Hence the preference in this
study to employ conventional PWR fuel.
In recent years, so-called Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), with power outputs less than 300
MWe, have gained attention (OECD-NEA (2011)). The primary aim of SMRs is to reduce the
size of the reactor in order to reduce the capital cost to the extent where it becomes favourable
for certain sectors to consider investing in nuclear power (many sectors cannot afford nor re-
quire >1 GWe plants as is the case in the shipping sector) and also to benefit from economies
of mass production rather than economies of scale (OECD-NEA (2011)). The relative trade-off
between economies of scale vs economies of mass production is highly uncertain as usually there
are a number of essentially fixed costs in building a nuclear power plant, for instance licensing
the reactor and securing the facility; therefore, in a conventional nuclear power plant, specify-
ing a larger power reduces the relative expense of these costs. Furthermore, for many reactor
components it may be the case that their price does not scale directly with the power output
(OECD-NEA (2011)). However, there are benefits that may offset some of these disadvantages;
for example a smaller size may permit new reactor designs and manufacturing methods to be
utilised (Ingersoll (2009)). As the vast majority of reactors that have been deployed at sea have
been PWRs, we have decided here to focus on developing a PWR core specifically designed to
power large container ships, with power demands of approximately 100 MWe.
There is considerable uncertainty about the feasibility of being able to license a nuclear pow-
ered ship with a limited number of personnel on board (see Section 2.4 for more details). Hence
it is prudent to try to identify systems that add to the complexity of the reactor system and whose
removal may significantly simplify reactor operation, minimising demands upon personnel on
board the ship. A particular focus in the present study was given to systems that directly influ-
ence neutronics and fuel performance. A key system identified was the system that delivers and
maintains the correct concentration of Soluble Boron (SB).
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1.1. Non-Technical Barriers to Deployment
There are a number of non-technical barriers to deploying nuclear-powered civilian ves-
sels. Firstly, insurance presents a considerable problem. There is currently insufficient actuarial
data to accurately determine the risks associated with operating nuclear-powered container ships
(RAEng (2013)). Whilst there are operating PWRs on board ships at sea, these do not operate
under the same conditions as container ships, which frequently visit ports near high population
centres and travel in busy ship lanes where the risk of collision is not negligible. This results in
a large degree of economic uncertainty with respect to ensuring sufficient finance is in place to
cover the costs associated with any accident. In order to reduce the economic risks to the oper-
ator of the ship it may be necessary to insist on government (or governments) to underwrite the
insurance. This is currently the case for conventional land-based nuclear power plants, where the
operator’s liability is typically limited to around £1 billion, and beyond this limit the state acts as
insurer of last resort (WNA (b)).
Port restrictions are also likely to be in place as a number of countries are opposed to nuclear
power and may not permit the vessels to enter their waters. However, the overall effect will
likely be limitations with respect to the route a nuclear-powered ship can take and result in the
ship exhibiting a higher capacity factor, which has been factored into this study.
Disposing of nuclear waste will also very likely be more politically complex than for waste
produced at land-based systems. This is because whilst the operator will likely have to cover
the cost of disposal, it will also be necessary to find a country willing to host the nuclear waste.
There is currently opposition within many countries regarding for disposal of nuclear waste from
land-based systems even when those countries have benefited for decades from the low-carbon
electricity their reactors have provided (Gill et al. (2014)). Hence, if the ship has served a number
of countries in transporting goods, should the waste therefore be split between those countries
or should the operator come to some sort of arrangement with their own country to deal with the
waste? This is an open question that this study does not address. It is important to note how-
ever that technical solutions have been developed for safely disposing of nuclear waste (IAEA
(2006)), with the limited progress made internationally not due to lack of technical solutions but
rather the political complexity of hosting facilities for nuclear waste sites.
Another potential issue will be the need and costs associated with well-trained staff able to
operate a nuclear reactor on board a ship and issues regarding reactor behaviour in the event of
collisions, foundering (the sinking of a ship due to taking on board water) and grounding of the
ship. In the case of foundering, there has been some precedent, as a number of nuclear powered
vessels have been sunk (Lind and Sickel (2001); IAEA (2001)). However, in all of the cases
reported the reactor was successfully shut down and remained so (IAEA (2001)). In addition, it
appears that given the high-integrity materials used for constructing nuclear reactors, the nuclear
fuel has not been openly exposed to seawater. All of these have resulted in relatively limited
exposure to radionuclides (IAEA (2001)). In addition, it is certainly the case that concerns are
more likely to be raised if a ship sinks in relatively shallow water near a populated area, and
hence retrieval of the core may be necessary. But even here there is experience relating to the
retrieval of once-active nuclear cores from the seabed (IAEA (2001)).
2. Core Parameters and Materials
Table 1 summarises the core parameters with the following sections detailing the reasoning
behind these parameters.
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Parameter Value
Thermal Output 440 MWth
Power density 40 kW/l
Thermal Efficiency 25%
Capacity Factor 93.5%
Fuel UO2
Lattice Type Standard square 17 by17 assembly
Cladding 2nd Generation Zr alloy (Zirlo)
RPV Outer Diameter 3.5 m
Targeted Core Life 15 years
Average Coolant Temperature 270◦C
Table 1: Summary of key parameters for the reactor being designed in this study.
2.1. Core Power
Surveying recent engine designs capable of powering large container ships resulted in the
propulsion power requirement being set at 80 MW(e) (Wartsila (2014); MAN (2009)). Given
that propulsion usually makes up around 75% of ship power requirements, with the other 25%
(the so-called hotel load, which refers to power requirements not related to propulsion) being
needed to power refrigeration, navigation and crew amenities, the total power requirement for
the reactor studied in this work was set to 110 MWe. It has therefore been assumed that the
reactor will produce electricity rather than powering the propeller directly simply because the
hotel load is quite substantial.
2.2. Core Life and Capacity Factor
Refuelling a reactor on board a ship is unlikely to be as rapid as the targeted refuelling period
of less than 20 days large PWRs are able to achieve (Westinghouse (2013)). This is because large
PWRs are designed to be flooded and a crane is already inside the containment building that can
readily transfer the individual assemblies from the reactor building to the spent fuel pond. It
was decided therefore that even if refuelling does require a longer dry docking period than is
normally the case, this would still be acceptable if refuelling the core is performed infrequently.
In addition, it is likely that ports able to refuel nuclear-powered ships will be very limited in
number and expensive to operate. Therefore the greater number of ships each port is able to
service, the lower the economic penalty. All of these points lead to a strong motivation to study
the maximum achievable core life.
Modern ships typically have lives of around 30 years (CCC (2011)). Over this 30 year period
they may typically undergo routine maintenance during dry docking which currently takes place
every 5 years; however, there is the possibility that this will be expanded to 7.5 years in the near
future due to the economic cost of taking ships out of service (Lloyd’s Register (2014)). It was
also assumed that it would not be possible to design a nuclear reactor using well established
materials capable of achieving a core life of 30 years because various degradation mechanisms
(such as corrosion) would render the reactor inoperable long before the 30 year core life was
achieved. However, it was thought that a 15 year core life would be achievable. A 15 year core
life is easily accommodated with dry docking intervals of 5 or 7.5 years, and also means that
each ship would only need to undergo refuelling once during its life.
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A typical container schedule was assumed to be 3 weeks at full power whilst travelling be-
tween ports and 2 days in port for cargo loading. Hence, targeting a 15 year core life and as-
suming that the power level of the ship when in port is reduced to around 25% of total power
(the hotel load) and when at sea the core is operating at full power, these assumptions result in a
Capacity Factor (CF) of 93.5%.
2.3. Core Size
SMRs typically have Reactor Pressure Vessels (RPVs) with diameters of less than 3.5 m
(WNA (2014)). A standard 17×17 assembly was chosen here for the assembly design; this avoids
the uncertainties associated with implementing a new grid design (Song et al. (2007)). Standard
17×17 assembly designs have dimensions of 21.42 cm by 21.42 cm and can accommodate fuel
pins up to diameters of 1.06 cm (Todosow and Kazimi (2004)). As the RPV’s outer diameter
is set to be less than 3.5 m, this places limitations on the permitted number of fuel assemblies
within the core. With the 17×17 assembly design, the maximum number of assemblies that could
fit into such a RPV was 89. The outer diameter of this array of assemblies was 245.14 cm with
the active length of the fuel rod set to 245.14 cm.
2.4. Soluble-Boron-Free Operation
An important requirement for a commercial marine reactor is minimising capital, operation
and maintenance costs in order for the system to successfully compete with other propulsion
technologies. By allowing the reactor to operate without soluble boron and rely more heavily on
mechanical reactivity control it was envisaged these costs could be reduced, in addition to some
improvements in safety performance.
In large GWe-class PWRs, soluble boron is used to: ensure satisfactory shutdown margins in
all core states with fewer rod control cluster assemblies; allow for reactivity control throughout
life without distorting power profiles; and reduce the residual poison penalty by relying less
on solid burnable poisons (EPRI (1989)). In large reactors the proportional cost attributed to
soluble boron operation is relatively small (EPRI (1989)). However, for smaller reactor systems
any additional operation complexity that results in greater personnel requirements (i.e. crew
size) is likely disadvantageous as personnel costs start to disproportionately affect total operation
costs. For comparison, a large PWR will typically have around 500 to 800 staff working onsite
(Energy (2017)), whereas a modern container ship will have a crew size of around 13 people
(ABS (2018)).
The elimination of soluble boron during operation would allow for considerable simplifica-
tions of the Chemical Volume and Control System, in particular a closed loop, high-pressure
coolant purification system could probably be employed (EPRI (1989)). In addition, chemistry
control would be significantly simplified and the nuclear sampling system would require less fre-
quent samples to be taken. Furthermore, the likelihood of boric-acid induced corrosion occurring
could be significantly reduced, thereby reducing the requirement for inspections and evaluation
of boric-acid-induced corrosion (Fiorini et al. (1999)). There would also be significant benefits
with respect to safety performance as the likelihood of boron dilution accidents would be greatly
reduced as the core should very rarely operate with boron in the primary coolant (Fiorini et al.
(1999)).
We assume it would be difficult to entirely eliminate the requirement for soluble boron as
in the event of any core damage resulting in fuel relocation it would be necessary to utilise an
alternative means for ensuring satisfactory shutdown margins. Therefore an emergency boron
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system, such as is implemented in Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), would be kept in reserve to
act as a redundant and diverse means to ensure reactor shutdown.
2.5. Operating Temperature
One of the important limiting phenomena in PWRs relates to corrosion of the fuel, that is
the amount of oxidation and the extent to which liberated hydrogen during oxidation is absorbed
by the cladding material resulting in embrittlement. Oxidation and hydrogen absorption are phe-
nomena dependent on temperature and time, with correlations relating corrosion as a function of
temperature and time constructed from empirical measurements (Tappingm (2012)). Commer-
cial PWRs typically have core inlet and outlet temperatures around 290◦C and 320◦C respectively
(Dalrymple (2012)), with typical fuel residence times in the core of around 5 years. It would be
impractical to expect fuel with current advanced zirconium alloy cladding materials to last for 15
years in the core, operating at temperatures between 290◦C and 320◦C. Therefore coolant tem-
perature in the marine reactor must be lowered, to reduce the likelihood of excessive corrosion
so as to ensure the survivability of the fuel during its 15 year residence time.
There is limited information in the open literature on the corrosion performance of advanced
zirconium alloys for periods of time comparable to the targeted core life. Hence it was decided
to use CANDU Pressure Tubes (PTs) as a proxy to estimate necessary coolant temperatures for
the core in this study. PTs typically reside in CANDU reactors for decades, with the latest PT
designs designed to be replaced every 30 years (Tappingm (2012)). Furthermore, given that
CANDU systems operate without soluble boron it is envisaged that the chemistry (in particular
the pH) will be broadly similar to the marine core designed in this study. However, PTs can only
be used as a crude proxy for predicting the performance of advanced zirconium alloys in PWR
conditions since:
• PTs utilise a different zirconium alloy to those in commercial PWRs;
• temperature gradients are lower in PTs; and
• neutron and gamma fluence is much lower than in PWR cladding material.
The information in Urbanic and Cox (1985) implies zirconium cladding materials can survive
for around 15 years if core inlet and outlet temperatures are limited to 255◦C and 285◦C, with
peak clad temperatures limited to 310◦C. The low coolant outlet temperature compared with
conventional PWRs will reduce the achievable thermal efficiency and it has been assumed that
the thermal efficiency will be around 25%. Given that the core must produce 110 MWe and has
a CF of 93.5% this results in an average thermal power of 411.4 MWth.
2.6. Selected Burnable Poison
The focus of this study is employing, as far as is reasonably possible, conventional light
water reactor technology in order to achieve a 15 year core life. Given that the system will
operate without soluble boron it is necessary to utilise a higher poison loading than is typical in
conventional PWRs. To date industry experience has focused on three Burnable Poisons (BPs):
Gd2O3, Er2O3 and ZrB2.
ZrB2 was ruled out for the reactor investigated here since there was concern that the high
concentrations of ZrB2 necessary would create issues regarding rod internal pressure from helium
production (Hesketh (2012)); also, the thickness of ZrB2 necessary to suppress reactivity would
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be far beyond existing experience raising concerns about the mechanical behaviour of the layer.
Er2O3 exhibits favourable neutronic properties for long-life cores but current experimental data
indicates poor behaviour relating to achievable fuel densities at high concentrations (> 2 wt.%)
(Yamanaka et al. (2009)). Gd2O3 does not suffer from helium production during irradiation and
it there is prior experience with manufacturing (U, Gd)O2 fuel with high Gd2O3 up to around
15 wt.% (Wada et al. (1973); IAEA (1995)). Therefore, Gd2O3 was employed in this marine
reactor design.
2.7. Control Rod Materials
The control rods employed in this study must be capable of operating for extended periods
of time, deep into the core since they, along with solid burnable poisons, will be the predominant
means to control reactivity. Most PWRs utilise Ag-In-Cd (macroscopic absorption cross-section
of 9.9 cm−1) control rods; however, a large proportion of the rod worth comes a single isotope
(113Cd) which accounts for only a small proportion of the available nuclides within the Ag-In-
Cd alloy. Therefore, it is to be expected that this single isotope will burn out relatively quickly,
greatly diminishing the rod worth (Gosset and Kryger (1993)). This is not a major issue in
conventional PWRs since the control rods do not penetrate deep into the core during normal
operation.
An alternative material for control rod material is hafnium, which has a relatively low macro-
scopic absorption cross-section (4.8 cm−1) relative to boron carbide (81 cm−1), but it has superior
properties under irradiation (low depletion of rod worth as a function of burnup, no gas release
and limited swelling). Boron carbide has a much higher thermal absorption cross-section and
in comparison to hafnium is relatively inexpensive. Hence, it was decided to employ a hybrid
design whereby the lower portion that is consistently in the active region of the core is made of
hafnium, with the other portion made of boron carbide to increase overall rod worth when con-
trol rods are fully inserted. This same strategy is successfully employed in BWRs (Horn et al.
(2012)). The hybrid hafnium and boron carbide control rods employed in this design are in the
standard 24 finger rod control cluster assembly.
3. Comparison with other PWR systems
There are a number of Small Modular PWRs (SM-PWRs) at various stages of development.
Notable examples include: NuScale’s SMR design, with a power output (factoring in the re-
cently reported up-rate) of around 200 MWth/60 MWe and refuelling period of 2 years (NuS-
cale, 2018); the ACP100, with a power output of 310 MWth/100 MWe and refuelling period
of 2 years (Zhu et al., 2016); and Westinghouse’s SM-PWR concept, with an output of around
800 MWth/225 MWe (Liao et al., 2016). In common with the majority of SM-PWR designs,
these SM-PWRs all nominally employ soluble boron in the coolant during normal operation.
There are however also some concepts that intend to operate without soluble boron, for example
the Flexblue SMR with an output of 550 MWth/160 MWe, and with some Flexblue core variants
having a cycle length of 38 months (Ingremeau and Cordiez, 2015). All of these systems have
refuelling periods much less than the 15 years refuelling period we aim for. Furthermore, they do
not specifically target the power demands of container ships. However, many of the techniques
of modularisation these systems intend to employ, would directly benefit the system developed
here, including advanced manufacturing techniques such as hot isostatic pressing and electron
beam welding (Gandy et al., 2016).
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In contrast to large and small land-based PWRs, the core designed here will need to consider
the unique characteristics of operating at sea. From a neutronic perspective, for a PWR system
there are no direct impediments to operating at sea under normal operating conditions, i.e. the
pitch and roll of the ship does not need to be taken into account in the calculations presented
here. However, there are important characteristics such as shutdown and thermal-hydraulic char-
acteristics that will require careful consideration, and would need to factored into the next stages
of development for the marine core outlined here. In the case of shutdown, it is important that
the control rods can be inserted and remain inserted independent of core orientation and thermal-
hydraulics will need to ensure adequate cooling (including decay heat removal) under any ori-
entation. Finally, in the event of grounding any systems that are nominally cooled by sea-water
will necessitate alternative backup coolant options.
4. Core design
4.1. Neutronics
The core design employed Studsvik’s CASMO-4/SIMULATE-3 neutronic suite (Zimmerman
et al. (1999)) with the JEF 2.2 nuclear data library. CASMO-4 is a multi-group two-dimensional
neutron transport theory code for modelling fuel assemblies, whereas SIMULATE-3 is a 3D
nodal code that utilises diffusion theory. SIMULATE employs the output from CASMO-4 to
model the entire reactor core and is used for determining the spatial and time dependence of the
neutron flux throughout core life, where the slow variation of the global flux permits the use of
the diffusion equation (Stammler and Abbate (1983)).
The core design process employed in this study consists of two key heuristic steps:
1. Optimisation with homogeneous fuel rods (no axial variation of enrichment or burnable
poison) and no control rods present. Initially a loading pattern is developed with a relative
power fraction (peak power to average power) highest in the centre of the core with a value
below 1.5 at the beginning of life. Once this criteria is met, the optimisation proceeds to
step 2.
2. Optimisation with heterogeneous fuel rods (axial variation of enrichment and poison con-
centration) and with control rods inserted into the core. A control rod loading pattern is
developed where no Rod Control Cluster Assembly (RCCA) is permitted to be inserted
greater than 50% of the way into the core during normal operation. In addition, the control
rods must meet a hot zero power shutdown criterion and a cold zero power (CZP) shutdown
criterion. As will be shown, the CZP criterion is most difficult to meet and necessitated
numerous iterations for the soluble boron free core designed here.
4.1.1. Optimisation with homogeneous fuel rods and no control rods present
Due to the long core life and lack of soluble boron during normal operation, a large number of
burnable poison pins (BPPs) were required in order to satisfactorily suppress reactivity over core
life. Two distinct BPP layouts were chosen, with the ratio of these lattice types within the core
adjusted to minimise excess reactivity and power peaking factors. Figure 1 shows the two lattice
types and Figure 2 shows the chosen layout for these lattices, based on manually optimising the
position of the lattices to minimise power peaking. Table 2 gives further details on the contents
(235U enrichment and Gd2O3 concentrations) of the lattice shown in Figure 2. The limits in Table
2 were chosen to be within the constraints outlined in Section 2.6 and obeying the 20 wt.% limit
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on 235U content. Figures 3 and 4 shows the radial power profiles and reactivity variation as a
function of time, respectively, for the core shown in Figure 2.
(a) Assembly with 76 burnable poison pins - this lay-
out is utilised in later assembly designs.
(b) Assembly with 96 burnable poison pins.
Figure 1: Location of the Burnable Poison Pins (BPPs) (in black) which contain a mixture of UO2 and
Gd2O3, and the fuel pins (in red). The layout of the BPPs was based on the fact that the reactivity, and
therefore power, tends to peak in fuel rods next to the water channels where increased neutron moderation
is taking place. Hence, BPPs are located in close proximity to these channels in order to try and limit power
peaking in the assemblies.
! F! E! D! C! B! A!!6! !76! ! 76! !96! !76! !96! !96!
!7! !76! ! 96! !76! !76! !96! !96!!8! !96! ! 76! !76! !96! !96! !!9! !76! ! 76! !96! !96! !96! !
!10! !96! ! 96! !96! !96! ! !!11! !96! ! 96! ! ! ! !
!
Figure 2: A 1/4 core layout for the core designed in this study. The colours and numbers represent assem-
blies IDs with their contents shown in Table 2.
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Assembly ID Enrichment (wt.%) Gd2O3 content (wt.%)
96 16.5 11
96 15.5 12
96 13.5 13
76 12.5 15
76 11.5 16
76 10.5 17
Table 2: Breakdown of individual assembly contents. The assembly IDs correspond to those in Figure 2,
with the number in the assembly ID describing the number of BPPs within that assembly. Note that pins
within an assembly have identical enrichment but some pins will contain burnable poison (at the concentra-
tion detailed above) and the remaining pins will consist of just UO2.
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Figure 3: Radial power profiles for core layout shown in Figure 2 as a function of time, with a core diameter
of 2.45 m.
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Figure 4: keff evolution for core shown in Figure 2 with homogeneous fuel rods and no control rods inserted.
4.1.2. Optimisation with heterogeneous fuel rods and control rods present
To compensate for the excess reactivity shown in Figure 4 a control rod arrangement needed
to be chosen. Initially two key constraints were chosen that the control rods had to meet. These
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were:
• No RCCA must have an insertion depth > 50% during power operation - this heuristic rule
was set as deep RCCA insertion during operation would likely result in large reactivity
insertions in the event an RCCA is rapidly withdrawn during a transient;
• The effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) with highest worth rod stuck < 0.98 at
Hot Zero Power (HZP)
h1 
h2 
h 
 HP 
LP 
LP 
Figure 5: Illustrating how the assemblies were split into 3 axial regions: a top Low Poison (LP) region, a
middle High Poison (HP) region and a bottom LP region, to reduce power peaking when control rods were
inserted. The colours indicate regions with the same enrichment and containing burnable poison pins with
the same concentration of Gd2O3. The height of the top (h1) and bottom (h2) axial regions were determined
as outlined in this section.
It was necessary to vary the poison and enrichment along the length of the assemblies to
maximise rod worth and therefore minimise rod insertion. Starting from an axially homogenous
design, the assemblies were divided into three regions as shown in Figure 5. The top and bot-
tom region of each assembly have identical composition with lower poison concentration and/or
higher 235U enrichment than the middle region. This will in general allow for an increase in rod
worth and also flatter power profiles than an axially homogenous design.
The chosen axial enrichment/poison contribution is shown in Table 3 and the values for h1
and h2 were 100 cm and 20 cm respectively.
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Lattice Low Enrichment High Enrichment High Poison Low Poison
key region (wt.%) region (wt.%) content (wt.%) content (wt.%)
96 15.5 17.25 16 6.75
96 14.5 16.25 17 7.75
96 12.5 14.25 18 8.75
76 11.5 13.25 18 10.75
76 10.5 12.25 19 11.75
76 9.5 11.25 20 12.75
Table 3: Breakdown of individual lattice contents of the optimised core. The lattice keys correspond to
those in Figure 2.
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(a) Initial layout with 45 RCCAs.
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(b) Second iteration of layout with 81 RCCAs.
Figure 6: The Rod Control Cluster Assemblies (RCCAs) groups (banks) for the first two configurations
studied.
Initially a control rod loading pattern was selected (see Figure 6a) and a matrix of poison
contents, 235U enrichments and zone heights were chosen. A large number of cores were then
modelled from these variables and the core that: 1) met the criteria relating to rod insertion limits
during operation and the Hot Zero Power (HZP) shutdown criterion highlighted earlier: and 2)
had the lowest through-life peaking factor, was selected as the most viable design. However,
initial control rod loading patterns (with 45 RCCAs) were unsuccessful in meeting the needed
shutdown margins and rod ejection criteria. Figure 6b shows the optimised control rod loading
pattern, with 81 RCCAs, that successfully met these requirements.
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Figure 7: Variation of RCCA position as a function of core life.
Figure 7 details the variation of RCCA position as a function of core life for the axially
heterogeneous core. Figure 7 shows that during power operation no control rods penetrate any
more than around 40% of the active core length. As discussed earlier, hafnium is well-suited
for residing within the active region of the core for longer periods of time (it depletes slowly and
does not exhibit unfavourable irradiation properties such as excessive swelling or helium produc-
tion). However, since hafnium is only relatively weakly absorbing, a hybrid RCCA design was
employed with the remainder (60%) of the RCCA consisting of B4C for the reasons discussed
earlier. The use of boron in the remainder of the rod will help meet the more stringent cold zero
power (CZP) criterion of having a keff with highest worth rod stuck < 0.95 at Cold Zero Power
(CZP).
The HZP shutdown criterion was satisfactorily met with the RCCA layout shown in Figure
6a (max keff over core life under HZP conditions was 0.90). However with 81 RCCAs max keff
at CZP with highest worth rod stuck resulted in keff >0.95. Therefore, in the final iteration of the
RCCA layout, a fifth bank, consisting of 8 RCCAs, was introduced (so that every fuel assembly
had a dedicated RCCA) resulting in a maximum keff of 0.92 at CZP with the highest worth rod
stuck. This extra group of RCCAs would not need to penetrate the active region of the core
during normal operation and would operate solely as a shutdown bank.
4.1.3. Reactivity Coefficients and Xenon Transients
An important characteristic of any viable core design is its stability to power changes. To en-
sure an inherently stable core design, the power coefficient of reactivity must be kept negative for
all conceivable operating conditions. The two dominant effects in most reactors are the Doppler
coefficient and Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) (Duderstadt and Hamilton (1976)).
When licensing a core design the whole gamut of reactivity coefficients must be studied, but to
simplify analysis only the MTC and Doppler coefficient were considered here. The Moderator
Temperature Coefficients throughout life are in the range -5 to -76 pcm/ ◦C. The Doppler coeffi-
cients were in the range -4 to -62 pcm/ ◦C. These coefficients are consistent with those in large
licensed PWRs that exhibit acceptable feedback behaviour (EDFE (2012)).
In conventional (GWe) LWRs, so-called xenon transients complicate startup, shutdown and
power level changes. In the case of reactor shutdown, 135Xe will initially build up as the de-
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struction mechanism of 135Xe to 136Xe is no longer available due to zero neutron flux, and the
inventory of 135I will decay to 135Xe. The increase in 135Xe concentration implies that excess
reactivity will be required to achieve re-criticality, as the inventory of 135Xe increases up until
the point where the predominant mechanism determining 135Xe concentration is the decay of this
isotope. Xenon transients are usually overcome using chemical reactivity control (i.e. adjustment
in soluble poison concentration) and most reactors world-wide only undergo relatively modest
changes in power or operate at a fixed power level, therefore xenon transients are only normally
problematic in unplanned outages. However, for a marine reactor, there is no scope to operate
the reactor at a fixed power level as the ship will enter port on a relatively frequent basis and
the power level will need to be decreased. Therefore the behaviour of the core with power level
changes was studied.
Table 4 shows the series of xenon transients performed on the core at various points in core
life. Xenon clearly has minimal impact on core reactivity throughout life - for comparison con-
ventional PWRs can experience negative reactivity insertions of up to approximately 1000 pcm.
The reason behind the core’s relative insensitivity to xenon transients (which is advantageous
for a reactor expected to routinely undergo significant power changes) is due to the low thermal
flux in the core, since the behaviour of xenon is heavily dependent on the steady-state flux level
(Duderstadt and Hamilton (1976)). The average thermal flux across the core within this reactor
at end of life, calculated by SIMULATE, was found to be around 6×1012 neutrons s−1cm−2. For
large PWRs the thermal flux is typically of the order of 1014 neutrons s−1cm−2.
Time transient Peak Xe Associated reactivity
initiated time decrement
10 d 1.6 h -6 pcm
4.90 y 1.8 h -11 pcm
10.0 y 1.6 h -10 pcm
15.0 y 3 h -38 pcm
Table 4: Details the negative reactivity insertion associated with xenon transients taking place at various
points in core life under Hot Zero Power conditions.
Figure 8 shows the change in thermal flux over core life. Given the low power density of the
core developed here (approximately 40% of a standard PWR) and the much higher enrichment
(around four times higher), it is expected that flux in the core will be much lower by around
0.4×0.25 = 0.1 times the flux of a conventional PWR. Note that the total thermal flux increases
over core life and therefore depletion of the fuel - that is to say, to maintain a constant power
output the flux must continuously increase. The larger thermal flux at the end of life (EOL)
relative to beginning of life (BOL) helps explain the larger sensitivity to xenon at EOL shown in
Table 4.
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Figure 8: Thermal flux as a function of time for the marine core designed in this study.
To summarise, the necessity of a long core life, which results in low power densities, high
enrichments and high poison concentrations also results in a low thermal flux throughout life
and therefore limited 135Xe sensitivity. It should be noted that the low thermal flux for this core
would carry a considerable economic penalty since 235U will less readily undergo fission, which
results in the relatively high 235U enrichment and hence higher fuel costs. However, this needs
to be weighed against the advantages associated with a longer core life that were highlighted
earlier.
Besides overall core reactivity changes, the dependence of 135Xe on flux also creates the
possibility for localised variations in 135Xe concentration within the core, which can lead to
so-called xenon oscillations. Xenon oscillations occur due to perturbations in the flux within a
reactor (Duderstadt and Hamilton (1976)). Given the limited effect of xenon within the core (due
to the low thermal flux) the marine core was found to be robust against axial and radial xenon
oscillations.
4.2. Monte Carlo Benchmarking
Compared to conventional large PWRs the marine reactor in this study has a significantly
lower power density (40 kW/l vs 105 kW/l) and significantly higher Gd2O3 (around 13 wt.%
vs 6 wt.%) and 235U concentrations (around 13 wt.% vs 4 wt.%). CASMO-SIMULATE is well
validated for conventional PWRs but the core designed in this study is expected to be consid-
erably outside of the validation database CASMO-SIMULATE is based on. Therefore in this
study comparisons between whole core Monte Carlo runs, using MONK-9A, and the nodal code
SIMULATE-3 found discrepancies in the effective neutron multiplication factor throughout core
life of between 1-2%. Here discrepancy is defined as:
Discrepancy =
kMONK − kCASMO
kMONK
(1)
These discrepancies are much higher than those found when modelling conventional PWRs (dis-
crepancies < 0.5%) (Alexeev et al. (1998)) and should preferably be below 0.2%.
In order to determine the likely reason for the discrepancies between SIMULATE-3 and
MONK-9A, 2D lattice calculations (using the lattice geometry for the marine reactor) were per-
formed in MONK and CASMO in order to benchmark the two codes; noting that any discrepancy
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at the lattice level (CASMO) will directly impact the accuracy at the nodal level (SIMULATE).
Three cases were investigated; these were:
• Case 1 containing UO2 fuel pins containing 5 wt.% 235U surrounded by unborated light
water;
• Case 2 containing UO2 fuel pins containing 13.5 wt.% 235U surrounded by unborated light
water; and
• Case 3 containing UO2 fuel pins containing 13.5 wt.% 235U in addition to 76 burnable
poison pins containing 12.75 wt.% Gd2O3 surrounded by unborated water.
Case 1 represents a lattice equivalent to lattices found in conventional PWRs (albeit with the
slightly larger diameter fuel rods of the marine core designed here - a conventional PWR will
have a fuel rod diameter of around 0.95 cm (Dalrymple, 2012), whereas the core developed here
had a fuel rod diameter of approximately 0.98 cm, see Section 4.3). Cases 2 and 3 represent
lattices with compositions that are typical of the marine core designed in this study.
In order to try and identify an underlying phenomenon that could be causing the discrepancy
an attempt was made to quantify the hardness of the spectrum between the three cases. The
parameter employed was kfast/ktotal, where ktotal = kfast+kthermal 1.
Case Discrepancy kfast/ktotal
1 0.673 ± 0.006 0.254
2 1.084 ± 0.011 0.435
3 1.225 ± 0.017 0.543
Table 5: Discrepancies between MONK-9A and CASMO-4 for the various lattice types described in the
text.
Table 5 shows that the discrepancy significantly increases as the parameter kfast/ktotal in-
creases, implying that as the proportion of fission events occurs outside of the thermal region
(≥ 4 eV (Knott and Yamamoto (2010))) the discrepancy between these two codes increases.
In conventional PWRs around 80% of fission events occur within the thermal region of the
spectrum (Stammler and Abbate (1983)) and therefore light water deterministic codes tend to
solve the neutron transport equation in more detail in the thermal region. This is the case in
CASMO-4 where around 40 of the 70 energy groups are at thermal energies (Rhodes et al.
(2006)). Therefore, the number and distribution of energy groups is likely limiting. Furthermore,
there is also the complication associated with the generation of group-averaged cross-sections at
the beginning of the calculation, in particular those outside of the resonance region which often
assume typical LWR flux distributions which are probably unsuitable for the reactor studied here.
To assess the dependence of discrepancy on group structure the code CASMO-5 was em-
ployed, which consists of 586 energy groups versus CASMO-4’s 70 group structure (Rhodes
1In CASMO-4, kfast and kthermal are defined as the contributions to k∞ by neutrons with energies ≥ 4 eV and < 4 eV
respectively. k∞ =
ΣgΣiυΣ
g
f ,iφ
g
i Vi
ΣgΣiΣ
g
a,iφ
g
i Vi
where υ is the number of neutrons released per fission, φgi is the flux within mesh i and
group g, Vi is the volume of mesh i, Σ
g
f ,i is the macroscopic fission cross-section of mesh i and group g and Σ
g
a,i is the
macroscopic absorption cross-section of mesh i and group g.
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et al. (2006)). Whilst CASMO-5 has more energy groups in the fast region (around 170 groups,
which in part also results in a higher computational demand than CASMO-4) as a thermal lattice
code CASMO-5 still dedicates the bulk of energy groups to thermal energies. Discrepancies were
found to be slightly smaller for Case 2 (0.8% with CASMO-5 vs 1% with CASMO-4) and Case
3 (1% vs 1.2%). Therefore, the group structure is important but these results indicate that the
generation of group-averaged cross-sections at the beginning of the calculation (at the so-called
library level) also play a significant role. To truly capture the dependency of cross-sections on
neutron energy, around 105 energy groups would need to be used in a deterministic code (Knott
and Yamamoto (2010)), which results in impractical demands on computational resource. This is
why deterministic codes employ a coarser library structure, typically around 102 energy groups,
with the cross-sections for a particular interaction type (e.g. fission) at the library level calculated
via:
σg =
∫ E2
E1
σ(E)φ(E)dE∫ E2
E1
φ(E)dE
(2)
where σ(E) is the cross-section from the continuous nuclear data library and φ(E) is a flux spec-
trum that is typical for group g, with group g spanning the energy range E1 to E2. Equation 2
requires an assumption to be made for the flux φ(E) within a particular group. The approxima-
tions employed in industry standard codes, such as CASMO, proves adequate for conventional
LWR lattices (Stammler and Abbate (1983)) but as Table 5 indicates (the harder the spectrum the
larger the discrepancy) likely has limited validity for the core designed here.
The inherent ability of Monte Carlo codes to more accurately represent the nuclear data
and flux distribution throughout life results in a preference to regard MONK’s results, using
the continuous nuclear data library format, as less prone to systematic bias. As stated before,
discrepancies of greater than 0.5% between Monte Carlo and deterministic codes are generally
considered large and would certainly bring into question the ability to predict the behaviour of the
core throughout life to a sufficient standard to license the core design. However, this study is only
preliminary and is focused on the general physical behaviour of the core over core life (such as
xenon transient behaviour), where discrepancies of around 1 to 2 % are not unduly burdensome.
However, it highlights that deterministic codes will require modification to accurately predict the
behaviour of the core studied here to the licensing standard employed for conventional PWRs.
Note that other uncertainties, including their corresponding effect on reactivity behaviour,
will also be important. Design uncertainties, including temperature and geometry uncertainties,
can be much larger than the observed 1-2% discrepancy in keff . It is important to note that in con-
ventional PWRs the moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) can be most limiting, since at the
beginning of life it can be only weakly negative when boron concentration is highest. Therefore,
when uncertainties are included it is possible that MTC is no longer negative. However, in this
core design - which operates without soluble boron - this will be less limiting since the MTC is
more negative than in conventional PWRs.
4.3. Fuel Performance
A key element of core design is ensuring the survivability of the fuel during reactor operation.
From this perspective a series of design criteria are normally prescribed, with the most limiting
design criteria being:
• The extent of average clad hoop creep strain, which is typically limited to 1%;
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• Ensuring the rod internal pressure does not increase to a level that could result in rupture of
the cladding material. A conservative criterion typically applied is to limit the rod internal
pressure to that of the coolant pressure (15.5 MPa); and
• Limiting the extent of corrosion related phenomena (including oxidation and hydrogen
embrittlement).
The rod internal pressure is usually limited to being below the coolant pressure. This is
because of the possibility that if the rod internal pressure is sufficiently high then the pellet-clad
gap could re-open. Over time the initial pellet-clad gap will shrink in size due to a variety of
phenomena including the fact that fuel pellets swell as they burn up. However, if the gap were
to re-open later in a rod’s life then this could quickly lead to clad rupture, due to the fact that
the thermal conductivity across the re-opened gap will be heavily degraded by the presence of
gaseous fission products Xe and Kr (Uffelen and Suzuki, 2012). Both Xe and Kr possess very low
thermal conductivities and therefore a large temperature gradient across the re-opened gap can
arise. This can result in excessive pellet temperatures, which accelerates the release of Xe and Kr
from the fuel matrix, hence further degrading the thermal conductivity of the re-opened pellet-
clad gap and increasing the temperature of the fuel, thus releasing more fission gas (Uffelen and
Suzuki, 2012). Eventually the rod will rupture if its internal pressure becomes sufficiently high
due to the large inventory of gaseous fission products.
With respect to the clad hoop creep strain, a limit of 1% is usually put in place to ensure that
the likelihood of clad rupture is very low. As outlined in Section 2.5, the low coolant temper-
ature should limit corrosion-related phenomena; hence corrosion performance was not directly
investigated here, as it is assumed that insisting on maximum clad external surface temperatures
below 310◦C will ensure the survivability of the fuel rod from a corrosion perspective.
The neutronic calculations carried out in the earlier section allow for the individual power
histories for fuel rods to be determined. It was found that some fuel rods had EOL burnups of ap-
proximately 120 GWd/tHM, with around 80% of fuel rods having burnups below 100 GWd/tHM.
Whilst oxide fuel exhibits many favourable properties (high melting point, low swelling rate and
very good irradiation characteristics), and has been shown to operate to burnups > 200 GWd/tHM
in fast reactor environments, the existing database for validation of nuclear fuel under light water
reactors is limited to around 100 GWd/tHM (Rossiter (2011); Bremier et al. (2000)). Therefore,
only the fuel performance of rods with burnups of less than 100 GWd/tHM are analysed here. It
is assumed that future core iterations will reduce the range of burnups (perhaps via greater en-
richment and poison zoning), thereby ensuring all rod burnups are within the existing validation
database for LWR fuel rods and hence allowing greater confidence in accurately predicting rod
behaviour.
The fuel rod parameters, which constituted the initial choice for an appropriate fuel rod de-
sign, are shown in Table 6.
Using the fuel performance code ENIGMA (v7.8) (Rossiter (2011)) and sampling the fuel
rods that achieved burnups up to 100 GWd/tHM it was found that peak clad hoop creep strains
reached 4%, significantly above the 1% limit. However, modifications to the fuel rod design
outlined in Table 6 were investigated and found that increasing the pellet-clad gap size by a
factor of 2.5 (from 8.2×10−3 cm to 2.05×10−2 cm) was sufficient to reduce peak clad hoop creep
strain below the 1% limit and due to the core’s low power density, the greater gap size did not
result in excessively high fuel centreline temperatures. It was found that for fuel rods up to
100 GWd/tHM, the initial chosen fuel design with plena lengths of 25.4 cm (10 inches) each at
the top and bottom of the fuel, was sufficient to keep rod internal pressure below 15.5 MPa.
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Parameter Value
Pellet radius 4.267×10−1 cm
Pellet-clad gap 8.200×10−3 cm
Clad thickness 5.72×10−2 cm
Upper plenum volume 1.509×10 cm3
Lower plenum volume 1.509×10 cm3
Table 6: Fuel rod parameters.
Furthermore, by using the ENIGMA fuel performance code, and sampling rods across the
core, some fuel rods were found to have peak clad surface temperatures greater than the im-
posed limit of 310◦C. However, it was found that by varying the coolant mass flux across the
core from around 1200 kg/m2/s up to approximately 3600 kg/m2/s was sufficient to limit peak
clad temperatures to 310◦C. The disparities in peak clad surface temperatures across the core
are a result of the larger peaking factors in the core due to elimination of soluble boron from
the coolant. In the event further optimisation of the core design (such as through greater enrich-
ment/poison zoning) is unable to reduce rod power history disparities, then a logical solution is
to insist on variable channel flow across the core in order to minimise the differences in peak
coolant temperatures. The use of variable channel flow is well-demonstrated in LWRs and is
currently implemented both in BWRs and in some PWRs (of the VVER variety) through the use
of zirconium-alloy boxes that surround the sides of the assembly (to stop cross-flow between as-
semblies) and through the incorporation of artificial blockages to vary channel flow rates between
assemblies (Wiesenack (2012)).
4.4. Summary of final design values
Table 7 final design values based on the marine core developed here. The fuel rod parameters
require further optimisation as outlined in Section 4.3.
Parameter Value
Number of fuel axial regions 3
Axial height of top and bottom fuel regions 100 cm and 20 cm
Number of RCCAs 89
RCCA type Hybrid hafnium-boron carbide
Pin diameter 0.9842 cm
Upper plenum volume 1.509×10 cm3
Lower plenum volume 1.509×10 cm3
Inlet temperature 255◦C
Outlet temperature 285◦C
Peak clad surface temperature 310◦C
Table 7: Summary of core parameters for the marine core developed in this study.
5. Conclusion
This study has developed the core parameters for a marine reactor to be based on (including
power output, capacity factor and coolant temperatures), with a particular emphasis on ensuring
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the parameters and chosen materials would realistically allow for the targeted 15 year core life
to be achieved. Whilst the majority of goals have been achieved (235U concentration below 20
wt.% whilst achieving a 15 year core life, the elimination of soluble boron during operation and
fitting a reactor core within a 3.5 m reactor pressure vessel), the current design requires further
modification to ensure key fuel performance criteria are obeyed, in particular that the maximum
clad hoop creep strain throughout life is limited to below 1%.
For the core design described here, relatively small modifications (in particular increasing
the pellet-clad gap size) are required in order to ensure the rod internal pressure and maximum
clad hoop creep strain meet their criteria. This is especially true if future core designs limit the
maximum rod burnup to less than 100 GWd/tHM. The core has exhibited satisfactory shutdown
margins, reactivity coefficients and favourable xenon transient behaviour, with the latter due
to the low thermal flux in the core, which is due to the low power density and long core life.
However, issues with current lattice codes to model hardened spectra LWR lattices have been
identified. The advantages and disadvantages for soluble boron free PWR cores have also been
investigated.
The core developed here represents the first workable design of a commercial marine reactor
using conventional fuel, which makes realistic the idea of using nuclear reactors for shipping.
The application of nuclear reactors for commercial shipping will have a number of non-technical
barriers (including insurance, responsibility for waste management and the costs associated with
maintaining a well-trained crew to operate the nuclear reactor), which we have outlined and
where possible identified potential solutions to address these barriers.
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